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Preface 
 
The PMR indicator 
 
Since the end of the 1990s the OECD has been collecting a set of indicators to measure the 
developments in the product market regulation across OECD countries. Those years (and the following 
decade) have been characterized by a number of product market reforms. Pushed by the globalization 
and the technological change many OECD countries have been experimenting a process of 
liberalization in the network sectors, opening its markets to foreign competition and products and 
redesigning both public intervention and regulatory policies. The policy agenda too has been largely 
influenced by the product market reform. The PMR composite indicator attempts at capturing the 
salient features of this product market regulation. It tries to transform qualitative laws and regulations 
that may affect competition into quantitative indicators using a bottom-up approach. The data used to 
construct the indicators used in the PMR are obtained from a survey of member states and subject to 
peer review to assure comparability across countries. Being based on laws and regulation the 
indicators are not subject to subjective assessment of market outcomes limiting the measurement error 
in the data (but reducing the ability of the PMR to reflect market outcomes). 
 
Currently the PMR indicator1 comes from the aggregation of 18 low-level indicators that are grouped 
in 7 sub-domains and subsequently in 3 domains, State Control, Barriers to Entrepreneurship and 
Barriers to Trade and Investment. Data are available for all OECD countries except Greece, Ireland 
and The Slovak Republic (and Luxembourg for 1998 data). Overall the PMR indicator is computed for 
27 countries (26 in 1998) and for three years 1998, 2003, and 2007.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The construction of a composite indicator (CI) involves stages where choices have to be made: the 
structure of PMR in domains and sub-domains, the normalization of the original data, the weighting of 
indicators, domains and sub-domains, and the aggregation method. All these choices will affect both 
the ranking and the message brought by the CI in a way that deserves analysis and corroboration. 
Robustness analysis is a powerful tool to test the sensitivity of PMR ranking to the different 
methodological assumptions. In particular we are interested in three questions: 
  
(a) Does the use of one construction strategy versus another provide actually a partial picture of the 
countries’ performance?  
 
(b) Which countries have large uncertainty bounds in their rank (volatile countries)? 
 
(c) Which are the factors that affect the countries rankings? 
 
Two strategies can be employed to answer to these questions. Either we consider each methodological 
choice individually and we study its effect on PMR ranking or we consider all the possible sources of 
variability together and study its joint effect on the PMR ranking. The first strategy is addressed in the 
first tree sections by:  
 
                                                 
1 For PMR indicator (of composite indicator) we refer to the “integrated PMR” as described in the OECD Working Party 
n.1 on Macroeconomic and Structural Policy Analysis,  Product market regulation in OECD countries 1998-2007: update 
and extensions on the OECD indicators, ECO/CPE/WP1(2008)12.  
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(i) comparing two weighting schemes: one derived from principal components analysis (PCA) on 
different datasets, and another that weights equally indicators, sub-domains and domains (EW in 
short);  
(ii) exploring the issue of compensability;  
(iii) eliminating one indicator sub-domain or domain at a time.  
 
The second strategy will be the object of section five where the multi-modeling approach is described. 
 
Section six compares the design chosen by the PMR modelers with the statistical analysis of the 
datasets while section seven analyzes the actual contribution of each indicator, domain and sub-domain 
to the composite. Section eight concludes. Before proceeding with the robustness analysis we briefly 
present the “baseline” PMR composite indicator, i.e., the scenario in which data are not normalized, 
equal weight is assigned to each domain, sub-domain and indicators and all information is linearly 
aggregated. Figure 1 below displays the structure of PMR CI and, under parenthesis, the weights 
assigned in the baseline scenario. The country rankings of the baseline PMR CI are displayed in Table 
1 for the years 1998, 2003 and 2007. 
 
Figure 1. Structure of PMR composite indicator. Under parenthesis the weights assigned to each 
indicator, sub-domain, and domain. 
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The analysis of the different years (Table 1) highlights a number of countries whose position in the 
ranking varies a lot along the years. Australia goes from the 5th position in 1998 to the 11th of 2007. 
This is essentially due to a worsening of the performance in the state control domain (especially IBO 
sub-domain, see list of acronyms at the end of this document). Belgium sees its performance in state 
control worsening from 2003 and 2007, while Finland improves its position in 2003 due to the domain 
barriers to entrepreneurship (especially in the RAO and ABS sub-domains). The reverse happens to 
Hungary that has a worsening of its ranking position only in 2003. The drop in 2003 with respect to the 
1998 rank is due to a worsening of the domain barriers to entrepreneurship (and to some extent of 
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barriers to trade and investment) and especially of the sub-domain BAC (from the 12th to the 23rd 
position).  
 
The improvement of Italy from 2003 and 2007 is mainly due to state control and barriers to 
entrepreneurship (particularly sub-domains IBO and BAC). Japan climbs the 2007 ranking thanks to 
the performance in state control (IBO), while Korea experiment in 2007 (with respect to the 2003 
ranking) an improvement in barriers to entrepreneurship  (RAO) but a worsen of both state control 
(IBO) and especially barriers to trade and investment (OBA). Luxembourg and Spain are the countries 
with the highest variation in ranking.  Luxembourg jumps down by 10 positions between 2003 and 
2007 (1998 PMR CI has not been computed for this country given the high number of missing data). 
All domains and sub-domains worsen especially state control and barriers to entrepreneurship.  Spain 
starts with a very low performance in 1998 and reaches the 7th place in 2007 thanks mainly to the 
improvement in IBO and BTI. New Zealand deteriorates its ranking in 2007 due to the domain 
barriers to entrepreneurship and in particular the sub-domain RAO. The upgrading of Switzerland is 
largely due to the domain barriers to entrepreneurship (and the sub-domain RAO: from the 26th to the 
11th position).  
 
Table 1. PMR Composite indicator. Country ranking for the baseline scenario in 1998, 2003 and 
2007. 
 
Ranks 
Country 1998 2003 2007 
AUS 5 4 11 
AUT 14 18 18 
BEL 13 14 19 
CAN 3 5 3 
CZE 24 23 24 
DNK 6 7 6 
FIN 12 8 10 
FRA 20 20 20 
DEU 11 16 16 
HUN 17 24 17 
ISL 8 6 4 
ITA 23 22 15 
JPN 15 15 8 
KOR 18 12 21 
LUX - 13 23 
MEX 19 25 25 
NLD 7 9 5 
NZL 4 3 12 
NOR 9 10 9 
POL 26 27 27 
PRT 16 17 22 
ESP 21 19 7 
SWE 10 11 14 
CHE 22 21 13 
TUR 25 26 26 
UKM 1 1 2 
USA 2 2 1 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the relationship between levels and growth rates of the PMR indicator. In the X-axis 
the scores of the 2003 or 2007 PMR composite indicator and in the Y-axis the % change of the PMR 
composite between 1998 and 2003 and between 2003 and 2007. PMR data show a considerable 
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difference between the first period (namely 1998-2003) and the second period (2003-2007). In the first 
half decade is characterized by high efforts in opening the product market in all countries considered 
(that nevertheless had different levels of competition in those markets), while the pace of reforms 
slowed dawn in the following half decade. In 2007 data shows that, with the exception of 5 countries 
(New Zealand, Australia, Luxembourg and UK), all others have experienced higher levels of 
protectionism in product market as measured by the PMR. 
 
Figure 2. PMR scores versus growth rates. 1998 versus 2003 and 2003 versus 2007 
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2. Robustness of the PMR composite indicator with respect to the 
weighting structure  
 
In the 1998 round of PMR construction, the PMR indicator was computed using weights obtained via 
principal component analysis of a set of 21 OECD countries. In order to assure “weight neutrality” the 
same set of weights was applied to 2003 data. However, the current application of the 1998 dataset is 
no longer appropriate for three main reasons:  (i) over the 1998-2007 period the regulatory data have 
changed radically and 1998 weights are no longer representative of current policy environments; (ii) 
1998 weights may not reflect the relative importance of particular low level indicators since PCA was 
originally conducted on a subset of 21 OECD countries; (iii) the 2007 round of PMR update involves 
changes in country coverage and indicator structure that would make it impossible to assure “wage 
neutrality” across the various editions of PMR, unless back casting all PMR editions at each new 
update.  
 
For these reasons the PMR composite indicator for 2007 is based on a weighting structure that weights 
equally each domain, sub-domains and indicators (Figure 1). This weighting structure has a number of 
theoretical advantages: it does not depend on the number of countries in the dataset nor on the figures 
themselves (allowing the comparability across years). The drawback with respect to the previous 
version of the PMR indicator based on weights derived from principal component analysis (PCA, as in 
Nicoletti et als., 1999) is the correction for double counting. Equal weighting (EW) does not correct 
for double counting when indicators belonging to the same domain are highly correlated as PCA does. 
In order to see whether double counting indeed influences the country ranking of the PMR composite 
indicator, we compare the ranking obtained using EW with that obtained using PCA for different years 
and different sets of indicators and countries.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 compare EW and PCA keeping fixed the number of indicators (18) and the number of 
countries (27), but varying the dataset object of the PCA. In Figure 3 PCA has been performed using 
the 1998 dataset and the weights obtained have been applied to the 1998, 2003 and 2007 datasets. 
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Overall the difference between the two weighting schemes appear to be rather small: on average less 
than 1 position for 1998 and 2003 and 1.3 positions for 2007.  
 
In 1998, 13 out of 27 countries change their position in the ranking when PCA is applied instead of 
EW. The average change in ranking is of 0.8 positions with Sweden gaining 4 and Germany loosing 3 
places.  In 2003 the average shift in rank is a low 0.4 positions with no country shifting more than 2 
positions in the ranking. In 2007 the change is slightly more pronounced (on average 1.2 positions) 
when PCA is used. Spain and Hungary shift down in the ranking by 4 and 3 positions respectively and 
Japan moves up by 3.  
 
When PCA is conducted on the 2003 dataset or on the pooled 1998-2003 datasets and the resulting 
weights are applied to all the datasets available the absence of relevant changes is confirmed (Figure 4 
and 5). In all years considered, no country shifts more than 3 positions moving from EW to 2003 PCA-
derived weights, while the average change goes from 0.6 of 2003 to the 1.1 of 2007. When PCA 
weights are retrieved from the pooled dataset 1998-2003, the average shift in ranking by moving from 
EW to PCA-based weighting is 0.8 in 1998, and 0.4 and 1.3 in 2003 and 2007 respectively, with no 
countries shifting more than 1 position in 2003 and 1 country shifting 4 positions both in 2003 and 
2007 (namely Sweden and Spain respectively). 
 
 
Figure 3. Impact of weighting on PMR ranking. Comparison between equal weighting (EW) and principal 
component analysis (PCA) on 1998 dataset. 
Comparison PCA-EW for 1998, with PCA weights computed 
from 1998 data
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Comparison PCA-EW for 2007, with PCA weights computed 
from 1998 data
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Figure 4. Impact of weighting on PMR ranking. Comparison between equal weighting (EW) and principal 
component analysis (PCA) on 2003 dataset. 
Comparison PCA-EW for 1998, with PCA weights computed 
from 2003 data
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Comparison PCA-EW for 2007, with PCA weights computed 
from 2003 data
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Figure 5. Impact of weighting on PMR ranking. Comparison between equal weighting (EW) and principal 
component analysis (PCA) on the pooled 1998-2003 dataset. 
Comparison PCA-EW for 1998, with PCA weights computed 
from pooled 1998-2003 dataset
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Comparison PCA-EW for 2007, with PCA weights computed 
from the pooled 1998-2003 dataset
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As mentioned above weights derived from PCA depend upon the number of countries in the dataset, 
while EW does not; this is one of the major theoretical shortcomings of PCA weighting schemes. 
Therefore in order to check the extent of this dependency we retrieve PCA weights from a dataset with 
a reduced number of countries but we apply the resulting weights to all dataset and we compare the 
ranking obtained with the baseline. In particular, PCA is calculated using a dataset with 19 countries, 
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as in the 1998 edition (thus all available OECD countries excluding CZE, HUN, POL, SVK, MEX, 
TUR, ISL, KOR, and LUX). The resulting weights are applied to all the available dataset of 27 
countries (Figure 6) and compared with those calculated using EW. The average change goes from 1.2 
positions in 1998 to 1 position in 2007, with 3 countries shifting by 4 positions in 1998 (MEX, SWE 
and HUN) and just one country, ESP, moving by 5 positions in 2003. 
 
Any weighting method is sensitive to adding or subtracting indicators, especially weights derived from 
PCA which should correct for double counting. This is why we compare each weighting method using 
both a set of 15 indicators (as in the 1998 edition of PMR) and a set of 18 indicators (as in the current 
edition) in order to quantify the impact on country rankings of changing the indicator set. Figures 7, 
and 8 depict the comparison for the years 1998 and 2003. For both years the impact of changing the 
indicator set is slightly higher when the weighting method is PCA. If the average change in ranking is 
similar for both weighting methods (about 1 position in 1998 and 1.5 in 2003), PCA produces more 
outliers than EW, i.e. with PCA there are less countries varying its ranking but those countries display 
a larger shift. 
 
Figure 6. Impact of weighting on PMR ranking. Comparison between equal weighting (EW) and principal 
component analysis (PCA) on 1998 dataset with 19 countries. 
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Figure 7. Impact of weighting on PMR ranking. Comparison between equal weighting (EW) and principal 
component analysis (PCA) for 1998 using different sets of indicators. 
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Figure 8. Impact of weighting on PMR ranking. Comparison between equal weighting (EW) and principal 
component analysis (PCA) for 2003 using different sets of indicators. 
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Findings on the robustness of the PMR composite indicator with respect to the 
weighting structure 
 
Overall, within the available datasets, there is no significant difference in country 
rankings between using equal weighting or PCA-retrieved weights, pointing to a 
negligible effect of double counting which is diluted by the structure of the PMR 
composite indicator. Yet the theoretical dependency of PCA weighting scheme on the 
number of countries and the year of calculation make EW a preferable solution for the 
calculation of the PMR indicator  
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3. The issue of compensability: non compensatory Multi-Criteria Analysis 
 
An appropriate aggregation technique should also ensure that overall country rankings are not distorted 
by averaging out scores on regulatory areas that are not necessarily close substitutes. For example, while 
a country could offset the negative impact on competition of relatively numerous licensing requirements 
for business start-ups by having relatively light and transparent administrative procedures, it is not clear 
that high barriers to entry in potentially competitive markets can be compensated by a relatively low 
level of state control in the business sector. Yet, a purely linear aggregation approach would provide the 
same overall score to two countries that have opposite scores on these latter two dimensions of 
regulation (barriers to entry and state control). Therefore, while linear aggregation and compensation 
may be acceptable within each regulatory domain, they can lead to misleading results when aggregating 
domains into an overall country score. There is another (and related) reason to use a non compensatory 
approach. Munda and Nardo, 2003, noticed how weights, customarily conceived as ‘importance’ 
measures, are instead, in linear aggregations, substitution rates. As a result only non compensatory 
aggregations can maintain the role of weights as “importance measures”. 
 
The non compensatory multi-criteria procedure (MCA, Munda, 2008) tries to resolve the conflict arising 
in countries comparisons as some indicators are in favor of one country while other indicators are in 
favor of another. The approach employs a mathematical formulation (Condorcet-type of ranking 
procedure) to rank in a complete pre-order (i.e. without any incomparability relation) all the countries 
from the best to the worst after a pair-wise comparison of countries across the whole set of the available 
indicators. This method is therefore totally different from the standard linear aggregation of weighted 
indicators as in the baseline PMR CI and in all the analysis performed so far (and also afterwards).  
 
We offer here a ‘hand waiving’ description of the algorithm’ and then an example. Imagine to have three 
countries, A, B and C and aiming at ranking their overall performance according to N indicators. We 
build to this effect an ‘outranking matrix’ whose entries eij tells us how much country ‘i’ does better than 
country ‘j’. eij is in fact the sum of all weights of all indicators for which country ‘i’ does better than 
country ‘j’. eji will likewise be the sum of all weights for which the reverse is true. If the two countries 
do equally well on one variable, its weight is split between eij and eji. As a result eij + eji =1 if weights 
have been scaled to unity. We now write down all permutations of county order 
(ABC,ACB,BAC,BCA,CAB,CBA) and compute for each of them the ordered sum of the scores, e.g. for 
ABC we compute Y=eAB+eAC+eBC.  
 
We do this for all permutations and take as the multi-criteria country ranking the one with the highest 
total score Y. Note that this ordering is only based on the weights, and on the sign of the difference 
between countries values for a given indicator, the magnitude of the difference being ignored (this 
method can also be applied to ordinal data). With this approach no compensation occurs, to exemplify, a 
country that does marginally better on many indicators comes out better than a country that does a lot 
better on a few ones because it cannot compensate deficiencies in some dimensions with outstanding 
performances in others.  In other words to attain a reasonably good position in the ranking a country 
must devote a reasonably high attention to all policy indicators under a non compensatory approach. 
Note that the MCA method provides results in terms of country rankings, and not of a score, so it is 
particularly suited for categorical variables.  
 
The results of the MCA and the comparison with the baseline PMR indicator are shown in Table 2. 
We applied the MCA algorithm to the 3 domains of the PMR composite indicator weighting them 
equally. We therefore allow compensation at an indicator and sub-domain level but not at the domain 
level. That’s why we talk about a partially non compensatory method or ranking. 
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Table 2. Compensatory versus partially non compensatory ranking. Comparison between the 
baseline, fully compensatory, PMR CI and the partially non compensatory PMR ranking (MCA).  
 
                    
  1998 2003 2007 
  Baseline MCA B-MCA Baseline MCA B-MCA Baseline MCA B-MCA 
AUS 5 5 0 4 6 -2 11 10 1 
AUT 14 12 2 18 16 2 18 21 -3 
BEL 13 14 -1 14 11 3 19 18 1 
CAN 3 3 0 5 5 0 3 5 -2 
CZE 24 23 1 23 22 1 24 24 0 
DNK 6 7 -1 7 7 0 6 6 0 
FIN 12 17 -5 8 9 -1 10 14 -4 
FRA 20 22 -2 20 20 0 20 19 1 
DEU 11 15 -4 16 19 -3 16 20 -4 
HUN 17 16 1 24 25 -1 17 13 4 
ISL 8 8 0 6 3 3 4 1 3 
ITA 23 24 -1 22 18 4 15 16 -1 
JPN 15 9 6 15 8 7 8 11 -3 
KOR 18 18 0 12 15 -3 21 17 4 
LUX - - - 13 14 -1 23 22 1 
MEX 19 19 0 25 24 1 25 25 0 
NLD 7 6 1 9 10 -1 5 4 1 
NZL 4 4 0 3 4 -1 12 8 4 
NOR 9 10 -1 10 13 -3 9 9 0 
POL 26 25 1 27 26 1 27 26 1 
PRT 16 11 5 17 17 0 22 23 -1 
ESP 21 20 1 19 23 -4 7 7 0 
SWE 10 13 -3 11 12 -1 14 12 2 
CHE 22 21 1 21 21 0 13 15 -2 
TUR 25 26 -1 26 27 -1 26 27 -1 
UKM 1 1 0 1 2 -1 2 3 -1 
USA 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 2 -1 
 
The average difference between the two aggregation methods is about 1.7 positions for all the years 
considered (with a similar standard deviation of 1.4-1.7). There are however a number of outliers each 
year. Japan is the most volatile country in 1998 and 2003: it performs much better under the MCA than 
under the fully compensatory scenario. In the baseline, Japan, ranks 16th and 27th in the sub-domains 
state control and barriers to entrepreneurship, but ranks 3rd in barriers to trade and investment. The 
outstanding performance in the third domain is more than compensated by the reduced performance in 
the others, producing a medium ranking position.  
 
Notice that the first two domains count more on the composite than the third one (see below, section 
7). This is also why in 2007 Japan by scoring 5th in the first domain but 16th and 15th in the other two 
gets the 8th position in the baseline PMR ranking while only the 11th under MCA. The non 
compensatory multicriteria, is not influenced by the range of variation of the indictors since it is not 
based on scores. Good (bad) performance in “heavy” indicators is thus the main reason of the 
discrepancy between the two rankings for Finland and Germany in 1998 and 2007, Portugal in 1998, 
and Italy and Spain in 2003.   
 
Findings on the issue of compensability  
 
Overall, if compensation between domains is not allowed, the country ranking is 
moderately affected. The most volatile countries are those who perform better (worse) in 
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indicators belonging to the domains state control and barriers to entrepreneurship. With 
non compensability the unbalanced contribution of each domain to the composite is 
overcome, given the independency of the final ranking from the scores.   
 
 
 
4. Robustness of the PMR composite indicator with respect to the 
weighting structure 
 
 
The robustness of the PMR ranking can be tested by eliminating one indicator, sub-domain or domain 
at a time. In doing so it will be possible to draw attention to the indicator (sub-domain or domain) 
whose exclusion mostly affects the PMR ranking; and also to the country mostly affected by this drop 
out. Table 3 displays the average change in rank between the baseline and the PMR CI that would be 
calculated eliminating, one at a time, each indicator, sub-domain and domain (with weights properly 
scaled).  This can be seen as a proxy of the average impact of an indicator in the composite.  
 
The PMR CI for 1998 seems to be mainly receptive to indicator TI4, the sub-domain other barriers 
and the domain state control. In 2003 the largest effect in the ranking is produced by indicator BE2, 
the sub-domains public ownership and administrative burdens on startups, and the domain state 
control. This domain, the sub-domain public ownership and the indicators SC5 are mostly affecting the 
2007 ranking. The indicators recently introduced (SC3, BE8 and BE9) do not seem to have a large 
impact on the PMR results for all years considered (in 1998, BE9 shows the lowest impact).  Table 4 
shows the average effect in each country rank of eliminating one at a time indicators, sub-domains and 
domains, while Table 5, 6 and 7 display for each year, the absolute value of the shift. 
  
 
Table 3. Average shift from the baseline rank when eliminating one indicator (sub-domain or 
domain) at a time. Data ordered by indicator, sub-domain and domain. 
 
Average shift in 
rank   
  1998 2003 2007 
SC1 0.46 0.59 0.44 
SC2 0.69 0.74 1.48 
SC3 0.77 1.19 0.74 
SC4 1.31 1.48 1.48 
SC5 1.08 1.41 2.22 
BE1 1.23 1.78 1.85 
BE2 1.31 1.85 1.70 
BE3 0.46 0.44 0.74 
BE4 0.23 0.44 0.44 
BE5 0.23 0.59 0.15 
BE6 0.23 0.44 0.52 
BE7 0.15 0.37 0.67 
BE8 0.46 0.74 0.74 
BE9 0.15 0.59 0.52 
TI1 0.62 0.37 0.52 
TI2 0.54 0.74 0.81 
TI3 0.77 0.52 1.04 
TI4 1.85 1.19 1.48 
PUO 1.85 2.52 2.74 
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IBO 1.69 2.30 1.93 
RAO 1.85 2.15 2.07 
ABS 1.54 2.52 1.93 
BAC 1.00 2.00 1.63 
BTI 1.23 1.78 1.48 
OBA 2.23 2.00 1.63 
SC 2.38 3.19 4.15 
BE 1.77 2.15 1.70 
BT 2.00 1.48 1.56 
 
 
Table 4. Average shift from the baseline rank when eliminating one indicator (sub-domain or 
domain) at a time. Data ordered by country. 
 
                    
  1998     2003     2007     
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AUS 0.50 1.14 1.67 1.39 3.57 1.67 0.83 1.86 1.67 
AUT 1.39 3.29 3.33 0.61 1.86 1.67 1.28 2.29 2.00 
BEL 0.67 3.86 1.33 1.83 5.57 2.00 1.39 6.29 5.33 
CAN 0.67 0.86 0.67 1.28 2.29 1.00 0.89 0.86 1.33 
CZE 0.00 0.57 1.67 0.72 1.43 1.33 0.28 1.00 1.33 
DNK 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.28 2.00 4.33 0.72 1.14 2.67 
FIN 0.67 1.57 1.67 0.06 2.57 1.00 0.83 0.57 1.00 
FRA 1.17 1.71 2.00 0.89 3.00 1.33 1.00 1.14 2.67 
DEU 0.56 0.71 1.67 1.28 2.71 3.67 1.67 2.29 3.00 
HUN 1.06 3.00 3.33 0.33 0.57 0.33 1.50 3.29 2.33 
ISL 0.61 1.86 2.33 0.83 1.43 5.67 1.11 1.14 6.67 
ITA 0.94 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.14 3.00 1.89 2.00 4.00 
JPN 1.22 4.29 5.00 1.28 6.00 4.67 1.39 1.86 3.67 
KOR 1.22 2.00 4.67 1.22 0.86 2.33 2.11 3.57 5.00 
LUX - - - 1.44 2.29 1.33 0.56 1.57 2.67 
MEX 0.89 1.71 3.00 0.56 1.57 3.00 0.00 0.14 0.67 
NLD 0.56 1.29 1.00 0.28 1.29 2.00 0.89 1.57 1.67 
NZL 0.22 0.43 2.33 0.39 1.57 2.00 1.28 2.00 4.67 
NOR 0.17 1.29 1.33 0.94 4.14 2.33 0.72 3.43 1.00 
POL 0.06 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.39 0.14 0.67 
PRT 0.83 1.14 4.33 1.44 1.43 3.67 0.89 1.29 2.33 
ESP 1.06 2.29 1.33 1.28 3.71 2.00 0.83 1.29 1.67 
SWE 0.61 3.71 1.33 0.94 5.00 5.67 1.17 6.29 4.67 
CHE 1.72 2.14 2.33 1.61 1.71 2.00 1.39 2.43 1.67 
TUR 0.06 0.57 1.00 0.11 0.14 0.67 0.39 0.29 0.67 
UKM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.67 0.56 0.71 0.67 
USA 0.56 0.71 1.67 0.11 0.57 1.67 0.39 1.29 1.00 
 
 
In 1998 the most sensitive countries to the drop-out of one indicator at a time are Austria (especially 
when BE1 and BE2 are eliminated), France (SC5), Hungary (BE1), Japan (TI2), Korea (SC4 and TI4), 
Spain (TI4) and Switzerland (BE1 and TI4). Much less sensitive is the Czech Republic with no change 
in rank. A drop in rank of 8 (7) positions is experimented by Belgium (Japan) when eliminating the 
sub-domain public ownership, while 7 positions are the shift of Japan and Korea when the domain 
barriers to trade and investment is eliminated. 
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Table 5. Shift from the baseline rank for 1998 when eliminating one indicator (sub-domain or 
domain) at a time.  
19
98
A
U
S
A
U
T
B
EL
C
A
N
C
ZE
D
N
K
FI
N
FR
A
D
EU
H
U
N
IS
L
IT
A
JP
N
K
O
R
M
EX
N
LD
N
ZL
N
O
R
PO
L
PR
T
ES
P
SW
E
C
H
E
TU
R
U
K
M
U
SA
SC1 -1 1 -1 0 0 1 0 -1 1 0 1 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0
SC2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SC3 -1 2 0 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 -3 -3
3
4 4 2 1 1 0 -5 -3
-5 3
5 -3 4 -3 -3 -5
-3 -5
3
3 4
-3 3
3 -3 -3
0 0 -2 -2 1 0 1 1 -2 0 0 0 1
SC4 0 2 -2 -1 0 0 -1 -2 1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 2 -1 -1 0 0 1
SC5 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -2 1 1 -2 0 -1 0 0 2 -1 0 0 1
BE1 1 2 -1 2 0 -2 -1 2 1 -1 -1 -2 1 0 0 0 0 2 -1 -1 1 0 0 0
BE2 1 1 0 0 2 -1 2 1 0 0 -2 -1 1 0 1 2 -2 0 0 0
BE3 -1 2 -1 0 1 -1 1 2 -2 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 -1 0 2 1 0 0 1
BE4 -1 1 -1 -1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 1
BE5 -1 2 -1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 -2 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1 2 -1 -2 0 0 0
BE6 0 1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1 1 -1 1 0 0 1
BE7 -1 1 -1 -1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1 2 -1 -2 0 0 1
BE8 -1 2 -1 0 0 1 0 -1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 0 0
BE9 -1 1 -2 -1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -1 -2 0 0 1
TI1 -1 1 -1 0 0 1 0 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 1 1 -1 1 0 0 0
TI2 -1 -1 0 0 0 1 -1 -2 0 0 -2 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0
TI3 -1 2 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -2 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
TI4 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 -1 1 -1 -1 0 0 0 2 -1 0 0 2
PUO 0 5 -1 0 0 2 -1 -1 0 4 -2 -1 0 -6 4 0 0 0 -1 4 -3 3 -7 1 0 0
IBO 0 -1 7 1 0 2 -1 -3 3 -3 3 -4 6 -2 -2 -3 -1 0 0 0 3 -3 -2 0 0 0
RAO 0 2 -6 -1 1 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 -6 -1 1 1 0 3 0 -2 -2 5 -1 -1 0 1
ABS 1 6 -5 1 1 0 2 0 1 5 -1 0 -6 -3 -1 0 -1 4 0 1 0 1 -5 -1 0 0
BAC 0 5 -2 -1 0 2 1 1 -1 3 -2 -2 -5 -1 -3 0 0 1 0 0 -1 3 1 0 0 1
BTI 0 2 -3 0 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 -6 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 -1 0 0
OBA 0 6 -4 -1 0 0 2 1 1 -2 0 0 -3 0 -3 0 -1 0 0 2 0 1 -1 0 0 2
SC 0 -1 2 2 1 1 -2 1 -3 1 0 0 1 -1 3 1 0 1
BE -3 -3 -2 -1 1 -1 -2 3 -2 1 -2 0 0 3 -1 -1 0 3
BT 2 3 0 1 1 2 1 -3 2 -2 -3 -3 -2 -2 -1 2 0 3 -1 -1 -1 0 0
6 -5 -1 4 -6 -5 5 -5
4 4 -5 4 4 -2 4 -6
5 -7 4  
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Table 6. Shift from the baseline rank for 2003 when eliminating one indicator (sub-domain or 
domain) at a time.  
20
03
A
U
S
A
U
T
B
EL
C
A
N
C
ZE
D
N
K
FI
N
FR
A
D
EU
H
U
N
IS
L
IT
A
JP
N
K
O
R
LU
X
M
EX
N
LD
N
ZL
N
O
R
PO
L
PR
T
ES
P
SW
E
C
H
E
TU
R
U
K
M
U
SA
SC1 -3
3 -3 -3
-3 3 3 -3 -3
-6 4 3 -4 4
4 3 4 -3 -5 -3 6
4 -3 5 3 - -4 -3 5
4 -4 3 - -4 3 8 -4
-4
-3
5 -3
-3 3
3 4 -3 -4
0 -2 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 -1 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
SC2 0 0 -1 0 0 1 0 -1 2 0 -1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
SC3 1 -1 2 2 0 1 -2 0 -1 -1 -1 1 0 0 -1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0
SC4 -2 -1 2 2 0 0 -2 1 0 1 1 1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 1 -2 0 0 0
SC5 -1 0 -2 2 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -2 0 0 -2 0 0 0
BE1 -2 -2 1 1 2 0 1 -1 -2 -1 -2 0 2 1 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1
BE2 0 1 0 0 -1 2 0 -1 -1 -2 2 -1 -2 -1 1 2 -1 -1 0 -1
BE3 0 0 0 -1 0 2 0 -1 1 0 -1 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 2 0 0 0
BE4 -1 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
BE5 -2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 -1 0 0 0
BE6 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 1 0 -2 0 0 0 -1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
BE7 1 0 0 -1 0 2 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
BE8 -2 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 2 0 2 2 -1 1 0 0 -2 0 1 -1 0 2 0 0 0
BE9 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -2 -2 0 0 0
TI1 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0
TI2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -2 0 2 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
TI3 0 -1 1 0 2 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
TI4 -2 -1 2 -2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 -1 0 -1 0 1 1 -1 2 0 -1 0 0
PUO 3 3 -7 -6 4 0 3 4 -1 -1 2 2 -7 -1 1 2 1 1 0 0 3 -5 2 3 0 -2 -4
IBO -5 -1 8 2 0 3 -3 -2 2 0 -2 2 8 0 -2 0 -1 -2 -6 0 -1 6 -6 0 0 0 0
RAO -4 -3 5 -1 3 2 -3 -2 4 -1 2 -1 5 -1 -2 1 2 0 -4 0 -1 0 -6 5 0 0 0
ABS -4 2 5 2 1 1 -4 -4 2 -1 2 2 8 1 -2 2 -1 -2 -7 0 -2 6 -7 0 0 0 0
BAC -3 -1 5 2 -1 2 -2 -1 3 -1 2 0 7 0 -2 2 -2 -3 -4 0 -1 3 -6 1 0 0 0
BTI -3 -2 4 2 0 2 -1 -5 3 0 0 0 3 1 -3 4 1 -1 -5 0 -1 2 -3 2 0 0 0
OBA -3 -1 5 1 1 4 -2 -3 4 0 0 1 4 -2 -4 0 1 -2 -3 1 -1 4 -5 1 -1 0 0
SC 1 3 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 -1 2 0 -1 -1 1 0 -3
BE -2 2 2 -2 2 2 -1 0 3 -1 -2 2 -1 2 1 -1 0 -1 -3 0 -2 1
BT -2 0 -2 0 -2 0 -3 3 0 -1 1 0 -1 0 -1 0 1 2 2 0 -1 -1 0 -1
-6 -5 -12 6 5 -5 -5 -4 8 9
4 4 -5 -8 4
5 -5 6  
 
In 2003 the number of volatile countries increases with respect to 1998, with Belgium highly sensitive 
to the drop out of many indicators in the sub-domains involvement in business operation and 
regulatory and administrative opacity (Table 6). Eight positions are gained by Portugal by dropping 
BE2 and 6 are gained by Spain by eliminating SC5. Belgium, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden are 
highly sensitive to the drop out of almost any sub-domain while the highest change when purging 
domains is experimented by Iceland that looses 12 positions. 
 
In 2007 the effect of eliminating variables is even bigger than in the previous years (Table 7). Ten 
positions in the PMR rank are gained by Belgium when eliminating SC5 and 8 are obtained by Korea 
when purging TI4. New Zealand improves by 8 positions its rank by eliminating BE1 but looses 8 
places when dropping out BE2. Mexico, Turkey, UK and US seems to be rather stable. Belgium and 
Sweden are the most volatile when dropping sub-domains, while 15 places are lost by Iceland when 
eliminating the domain state control from the dataset. The volatility is not necessarily a symptom of 
weakness of the ranking. In this case individual indicators have become more homogenous across 
countries in the decade 1998-2007: the standard deviation of each low level indicator, as a proxy of 
similarity between countries, has decreased over the sample period mainly for the domains state 
control (especially for SC3 and SC5) and barriers to trade and investment (particularly for TI4 and to a 
lower extent TI3). When scores become similar, slight modification of one score is likely to have a 
large impact in the ranking, determining in increase in volatility for that country.  
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Table 7. Shift from the baseline rank for 2007 when eliminating one indicator (sub-domain or 
domain) at a time.  
20
07
A
U
S
A
U
T
B
EL
C
A
N
C
ZE
D
N
K
FI
N
FR
A
D
EU
H
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N
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L
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A
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N
K
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R
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N
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N
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N
O
R
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L
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T
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P
SW
E
C
H
E
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R
U
K
M
U
SA
SC1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 -1 0 0 -2 -1 1 0 1 2 -1 1 0 0 0
SC2 2 2 0 -1 0 -1 -3 -5 3 3 4
-3
-4 3 4 3 0 - 3
10 -3 4 -4 3 -3 -3 -5 -3 -3
3 -3 3 3 -3 2 -3 -3 8 -3
3 -6 5 4 -8 4
-3
3 3 0 0
3
-3
-4 3
4 3
3 -5 8 3 -3 -3
-1 2 0 -2 0 0 2 0 -2 1 0 -1 -2 -1 1 -1
SC3 -2 2 2 -1 0 0 2 0 -1 2 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 -1 0
SC4 1 0 1 0 -1 -2 -2 1 -2 1 -1 1 -2 1 1 1 -2 0 -1 -2 0
SC5 -1 -1 2 2 2 0 0 2 1 -1 0 1 2 -2 0 1 -1
BE1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 2 0 0 0 -2 -1 -1 0 1 -2
BE2 0 0 1 0 -1 0 -1 -2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 -2 -1 -1 -1 0
BE3 1 1 1 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 -1 0 0 -1 1 -1
BE4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 -1 2 0 -1 0 -2 1 0 0 0 -1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0
BE6 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 1 -1 0 1 0 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 -1
BE7 0 2 -1 0 -2 0 -2 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0
BE8 -2 1 -1 -1 0 -2 0 -1 0 -2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 2 0 0 0
BE9 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 0 2 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 -1 0 0
TI1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 1 0 0 1 -2 -1 0 0
TI2 0 -2 2 0 0 0 0 -1 0 2 -1 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1 -1
TI3 -1 0 0 -2 2 -1 -1 0 1 1 1 -2 -2 -1 0 -1 -1 0 1 1 -1 0 -1 0 0
TI4 0 0 -2 0 2 0 -1 2 -1 1 -1 1 0 -2 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0
PUO 1 4 -5 -4 3 -2 -2 2 -1 -5 -1 -1 -5 1 0 0 3 -3 6 1 3 -2 10 2 -1 1 -5
IBO -2 -5 10 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 0 -2 1 3 3 0 -1 1 -5 0 0 -1 -7 -3 0 0 0
RAO -3 -4 6 -1 1 1 0 0 4 1 3 -3 2 2 2 -1 -3 5 -2 0 -2 -2 -3 -2 1 0 -2
ABS -3 0 8 -1 0 -1 0 -2 -3 8 1 -1 0 4 3 0 -1 -1 -3 0 -1 2 -7 -2 0 0 0
BAC -1 -1 6 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 2 -3 3 4 1 0 -2 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -7 -3 0 -2 0
BTI 0 -2 5 0 3 -1 1 -2 3 0 0 0 2 2 -1 0 0 2 -7 0 -1 -1 -4 1 0 1 -1
OBA -3 0 4 0 0 2 0 -1 3 1 -1 -4 0 9 1 0 -1 1 0 0 -1 0 -6 -4 0 1 -1
SC -3 -3 1 -3 1 -3 3 -2 3 1 1 3 -2
BE -1 1 3 -1 1 0 0 -1 1 3 3 -3 0 -2 3 -2 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 -1
BT 0 2 0 2 2 0 -1 2 -2 -2 -3 1 -1 0 0 0 1 2 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0
4 9 -6 6 -6 -15 4 -7 -6 5 9 4 1 1
4 -5 4 -4
-4 9 -5  
 
 
Findings on eliminating one variable at a time  
 
For all years considered the indicators inducing more volatility in the country ranking are 
those belonging to the sub-domains involvement in business operation and regulatory 
and administrative barriers, while the most influent domain is state control. Overall 
Belgium and Sweden together with Japan, Norway, and Spain are the most volatile 
countries when eliminating one at a time each sub-domain. 
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 5. Uncertainty analysis: a multi-modeling approach 
 
In the previous sections we have considered, one at a time, a number of sources of volatility in the 
PMR CI ranking.  However, more information on the robustness of this ranking could come by 
considering simultaneously the impact on the ranking of all methodological choices made so far. To do 
so we use a multi-modeling approach: we perform simulations (saturated sampling) based on the 
combination of three main assumptions on (a) the number of indicators, sub-domains and domains 
included; (b) the weights attached to each indicator, sub-domain, domains, and (c) the aggregation 
procedure.  
 
The multi-modeling approach  expands the analysis of the first section given that it allows to count for 
the joint effects in ranking of the different methodological hypothesis (in the first section we only 
analyze “direct” effects). This approach has already proven to be useful in the development and 
validation of several composite indicators (e.g., Composite Learning Index, Environmental 
Performance Index, Knowledge Economy Index, Alcohol Policy Index2) and was also included in the 
JRC/OECD (2008) Handbook on Composite Indicators. 
 
Table 8 below briefly illustrates the scenarios and their motivations.   
 
Table 8. Scenarios for the robustness analysis of the PMR composite indicator. 
 
Assumption Alternatives Comments 
   
Number of indicators All 18 indicators included or one-at-
the-time 
excluded  
 
Number of  
sub-domains 
All 7 sub-domains included or one-at-
the-time 
excluded  
 
Number of domains All 3 domains included or one-at-the-
time excluded 
 
The chosen set of indicators and its 
division in sub-domains and domains 
is only one representation of the 
reality. It is therefore important to 
verify the relevance and the 
explicative capacity of the conceptual 
framework used. Eliminating one 
indicator (sub-domain or domain) at 
the time allows us to verify the impact 
of this indicator (sub-domain, domain) 
in the final ranking of the PMR 
indicator.  
   
Normalization of  
the dataset 
No normalization 
 
 z-scores (subtracting the mean and 
dividing by the standard deviation) on 
the sub-domains scores 
 
 Sub-domains scored to be between 0 
and 1. 
The “baseline” PMR composite 
indicator is calculated from the 
original data expressed in a theoretical 
[0,6] scale with no manipulation. In 
the dataset, however, some variables 
have a much narrower range of 
variation. This makes that the 
maximum for some indicators is near 
the minimum of others (e.g TI4 and 
SC1 in 2007). This in turn implies that 
indicators with a broader range will 
have higher overall weight in the 
composite. To obviate we consider 
two alternatives. The fist is rescaling 
the dataset in order to have all sub-
domains’ maxima (minima) equal to 1 
                                                 
2 See  http://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  
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(0), and the second is calculating the 
z-score of the original dataset.  
   
Weighting method Weights obtained by PCA on 1998 
dataset but applied to all dataset 
available 
 
 Weights obtained by PCA on 2003 
dataset but applied to all dataset 
available 
 
 PCA within domain and PCA across 
domains (as in Nicoletti et als. 1999) 
 
 Equal weighting (EW) of the domains 
and the indicators disregarding the sub-
domain layer. 
 
 EW of domains, sub-domains and 
indicators (baseline) 
  
Usually there is no theoretical 
justification in the choice of a set of 
weights with respect to another. If 
PCA has the advantage of correcting 
for “double counting”, it is also 
sensitive to the new countries in the 
dataset and has to be calculated each 
year making the consecutive ranking 
not comparable. Furthermore, given 
the limited number of countries and 
indicators within sub-domains PCA 
has to be performed within domains. 
That’s why we consider as an option 
the EW of the 3 domains and of the 
indicators within each domain 
disregarding the layer of sub-domains. 
 
 
   
Aggregation rule Additive (linear) 
 
 Non compensatory on the domains 
  
We compare two different 
aggregations: the fully compensatory 
(additive) and the partially non 
compensatory. This latter implies a 
linear aggregation of the information 
up to the domain level but a non 
compensatory aggregation of the three 
domains (see Section 3. for an 
explanation of the technique) 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Combining all the possible choices of number of indicators/domains/sub-domains, normalization, and 
weighting, more than 400 scenarios have been produced for each year considered (1998, 2003 and 
2007).3 For each country we calculated the median rank of all scenarios generated and the frequency 
matrix of all rankings, that is, for each country the percentage of time that country obtained the first, 
second, third,… position in the ranking. Tables 9, 10, and 11 summarize our findings. These findings 
only refer to the linear aggregation of all the information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The exact number is (18+7+3)*3*5*1=420 scenarios for the linear aggregation.. 
 19
Table 9. Results of the robustness analysis for 1998.  Percentage of times each country ranks 1st, 2nd, 
3rd, ….. , 27th. 
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1 1 UKM 99 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 USA 0 60 22 12 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 3 NZL 0 11 42 23 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 6 1 0 0 0 0
3 4 CAN 0 12 19 40 8 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 6 AUS 0 2 2 2 25 40 20 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 6 DNK 0 1 2 9 35 22 11 8 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 7 NLD 0 0 0 1 12 20 46 17 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 8 ISL 1 0 5 1 13 13 11 44 5 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 10 NOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 40 34 10 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 10 SWE 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 17 30 4 9 6 7 4 1 1 0 15 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
13 11 BEL 0 5 6 6 1 1 1 3 8 8 15 19 12 7 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 11 DEU 0 7 0 6 0 0 5 1 6 15 32 19 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 12 FIN 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 29 16 25 14 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 14 JPN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 7 3 3 5 13 18 16 9 4 6 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
14 15 AUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 6 20 15 15 8 8 12 3 1 1 1 0 0 0
16 16 PRT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 12 8 8 16 28 12 7 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
18 17 KOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 6 11 19 4 12 13 11 5 4 6 1 1 0 0
17 19 HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 5 23 10 5 10 11 25 2 1 0 0
20 20 FRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 14 10 12 20 14 15 7 0 0 0
19 20 MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 5 8 11 16 18 11 6 14 7 0 0
21 20 ESP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 17 6 9 12 10 16 21 5 0 0 0
22 21 CHE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 9 6 4 14 25 6 22 0 0 0
23 22 ITA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 18 6 6 6 15 40 7 1 1
24 24 CZE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 58 33 0
25 25 TUR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 27 59 8
26 26 POL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 91  
 
Table 9 has the following reading: given all 420 scenarios generated from the dataset 1998, UKM 
ranks first 99% of the time, USA ranks between the 2nd and the 4th position 94% of the time, while 
NZL does it 76% of the time. The rows do not sum up to 1 because the tails of the distribution (5%) 
are not shown, considering them representative of extreme cases.   
 
A robust ranking would see the rank of each country quite stable across scenarios. This means that 
different choices of normalization, aggregation or weighting do not affect so much the position of the 
country. Robustness, in this context, is therefore a synonym of neutrality with respect to the modeling 
choices. As a rule of thumb4 we consider stable countries, those whose rank does not vary more that 7 
positions (roughly one fourth of the 27 ranks available). Therefore volatile countries will be those 
switching in rank by more than 7 positions. In 1998 Austria, Korea, France, Mexico Spain and 
Switzerland can be defined as volatile countries. 
 
Overall, the PMR CI seems rather robust to the assumptions tested. The median of the 420 scenarios 
considered and the PMR CI rank never differ by more than 2 positions. Only 7 out of 27 countries 
display a volatile rank.  Notice that for many countries (e.g. USA, Australia, Norway, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic) the baseline leads to the best possible ranking: any other methodological choice 
would have produced to a worst result. Moreover the baseline is never the “worst case scenario” 
backing the choice of equal weighting as baseline solution for the PMR indicator.  
 
The principal reason for the volatility is the weighting method based on PCA, which combined with 
dropping one at-a-time indicators could push up the performance of Austria, Spain and Italy; on the 
contrary net losers would be Korea, France and Mexico. The same explanation holds for the sudden 
shift from an otherwise stable ranking for some countries like New Zealand, Canada, Belgium, 
Germany and Japan.  
                                                 
4 There  is no literature available.  
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Figure 9 disentangles the effect of weighting within the multimodelling approach and confirms the 
role of PCA in the volatility of the 1998 PMR ranking. In this figure we compare the median 
performance with the performance of the most variables countries by contrasting the absolute shift in 
rank of 50% of the countries with the same shift of the 10% most volatile countries. It is clear from 
Figure 9 that, when taking into account all methodological choices made in the construction of the 
baseline, PCA weighting not only produces the higher median shift (sort of average behavior) from the 
baseline but also it produces the highest volatility. The higher average shift is produced when PCA is 
associated to the elimination of the sub-domain OBA. 
 
Figure 9. Sensitivity of weighting choices. 
Effect of weighting
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Findings on the robustness of the PMR composite indicator for 1998 
 
Overall, the PMR CI seems rather robust to the assumptions tested. The median of the 
420 scenarios considered and the PMR CI rank never differ by more than 2 positions. 
Only 7 out of 27 countries display a volatile rank. The weighting method based on PCA 
seems to mainly drive the volatility of ranking and the existence of “anomalous” 
performances. This weighting method makes the ranking particularly sensitive to the 
modification of the number indicators pertaining to each sub-domain and domain. 
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Table 10. Results of the robustness analysis for 2003.  Percentage of times each country ranks 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, ….. , 27th. 
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1 1 UKM 80 1 7 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 3 USA 1 37 26 13 5 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 ISL 17 32 28 15 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 5 ESP 0 8 13 27 13 7 9 2 18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 5 NLD 0 1 8 11 38 19 11 4 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 7 DNK 0 4 4 8 10 14 15 10 8 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 6 1 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 8 CAN 0 0 4 5 11 10 15 13 10 8 4 6 11 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 8 NZL 0 0 0 2 9 21 13 39 9 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 9 AUS 0 0 0 0 1 4 16 20 29 20 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 10 NOR 0 11 1 1 7 3 3 5 8 18 16 8 6 5 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 12 FIN 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 2 3 9 18 22 20 7 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 12 JPN 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 5 17 14 11 9 7 4 14 3 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 13 SWE 0 6 6 5 0 1 3 2 3 3 6 9 9 19 10 7 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
13 13 CHE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 23 12 22 14 10 7 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 15 BEL 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 13 8 6 6 8 12 14 20 4 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 16 FRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 11 2 13 18 11 15 14 9 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
20 18 HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 4 16 13 7 9 14 10 8 4 2 1 0 0
16 18 DEU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 7 9 10 7 13 11 13 17 2 2 0 0 0 0
17 18 ITA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 2 20 6 11 18 13 9 9 3 1 0 0 0 0
19 19 AUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 3 6 9 20 17 6 9 14 8 1 2 0 0
23 20 LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 15 30 17 14 15 2 0 0 0
21 21 PRT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 5 8 15 21 22 15 2 3 0 0
22 23 CZE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 9 30 40 6 4 0 0
24 24 KOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 58 31 1 0
25 25 MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 5 9 54 17 8
26 26 TUR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 18 5 70 6
27 27 POL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 86  
 
 
2003 ranking of PMR CI is more sensitive to the methodological choices made with respect to the 
1998 edition (Table 10). The difference between the median and the baseline rank is of 3 positions for 
Canada and the Czech Republic, 4 positions for Belgium and 5 for Norway. One third of the countries 
in the dataset can be considered as volatile countries and for Norway and Luxemburg the baseline 
constitutes the worst possible methodological choice. Notice that the assumptions embedded in the 
baseline guarantee to Canada and Belgium the best possible position: any other methodological 
assumption would not push these two countries up in the 2003 PMR ranking.  
 
PCA jointly with the elimination (one-at-a-time) of the indicators belonging to the domains state 
control and barriers to entrepreneurship mainly determine the instability of Portugal and Australia. 
For Sweden, Austria and France volatility is principally due to the interaction of 2 factors: a weighing 
method based on PCA and the normalization of sub-domains scores. Normalization plays a crucial role 
also in the volatility of Norway and Germany when associated to the one-at-a-time drop out of 
indicators especially those of domains state control and barriers to entrepreneurship. Finally Spain is 
particularly sensitive to the elimination of the sub-domains public ownership and regulatory and 
administrative opacity. The joint effect of normalization, weighting based on PCA and elimination of 
indicators pertaining to the domains barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment 
explain the sudden change in rank for Denmark, Korea and Japan, while for Belgium the joint effect of 
normalization and PCA is the only cause of the shift. PCA weighting seems, as in 1998, the main 
driver of most of the ranking instability. This is clearly shown by Figure 10. As in 1998 this weighting 
method account for both the higher median shift and the higher volatility. PCA combined with the 
elimination of the sub-domains OBA and BTI produce the highest shift in rank. 
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Figure 10. Sensitivity of weighting choices. 
Effect of weighting
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Findings on the robustness of the PMR composite indicator for 2003 
 
Overall, the PMR CI seems more sensitive to the methodology used for its construction 
than its 1998 edition. There are two main sources of volatility: the use of PCA weights 
with a dataset with a different number of indicators, as in 1998, and the interaction 
between weighting based on PCA and the normalization of sub-domain scores. The 
simulations suggest that (i) varying the number of indicators in the dataset and (ii) 
allowing the normalization of sub-domain scores, could have strong effects in the ranking 
when the weighting method employed is based on PCA. When the weighting method is 
EW (as in the baseline) the ranking appears quite robust: only for Germany, Spain and 
Norway the choice not to normalize scores induces some volatility in the ranks. 
 
 
 
The analysis of the 2007 dataset shows the presence of 13 (out of 27) volatile countries with France 
and Australia particularly unpredictable (Table 11). The difference of the median rank with respect to 
the PMR CI is of 5 positions for Canada, 4 positions for France and New Zealand and 3 positions for a 
bunch of countries including Japan, Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg and Korea. Canada, Japan, Italy and 
Korea are the country mostly favored by the methodological choices of the baseline, while the “net 
losers” are New Zealand, Belgium, Luxembourg and to some extent France. 
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Table 11. Results of the robustness analysis for 2007.  Percentage of times each country ranks 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, ….. , 27th. 
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2 1 UKM 84 7 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 USA 6 63 22 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 5 ISL 8 15 17 12 13 7 7 4 4 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
7 5 ESP 0 3 17 24 16 12 12 9 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 6 NLD 0 2 14 13 14 14 23 12 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 7 DNK 0 4 4 6 12 14 10 10 6 4 11 3 1 0 10 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 8 CAN 0 0 9 17 11 7 5 10 12 13 3 3 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 8 NZL 0 2 3 12 6 7 9 14 21 9 5 5 1 1 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 10 AUS 0 0 1 2 8 5 8 10 9 8 11 11 11 8 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 10 NOR 0 0 3 3 4 6 7 10 14 9 8 6 4 2 3 7 6 6 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
10 11 FIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 11 19 24 27 9 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 11 JPN 1 0 1 6 2 3 2 10 7 16 7 4 3 12 10 5 6 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 13 SWE 0 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 6 7 13 11 9 4 10 9 10 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 15 CHE 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 5 6 19 14 14 13 11 8 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 16 BEL 0 0 0 1 0 10 6 1 3 3 2 4 5 4 9 18 10 9 7 4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
20 16 FRA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 6 6 11 9 11 6 10 11 6 9 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
17 16 HUN 0 0 1 0 11 7 1 0 0 1 3 3 2 8 6 7 15 12 12 4 4 2 1 0 0 0 0
16 18 DEU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 7 7 11 7 7 8 15 11 11 4 3 0 0 0 0
15 18 ITA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 6 14 7 18 14 8 13 11 1 0 0 0 0
18 20 AUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 6 6 9 21 17 11 16 1 0 0 0
23 20 LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 12 1 1 2 4 10 20 12 17 9 5 0 0 0
22 22 PRT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 12 15 24 31 5 0 0 0
24 23 CZE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 4 9 10 24 39 7 0 0
21 24 KOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 1 4 3 3 3 5 9 11 30 22 1 0
25 25 MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 55 25 9
26 26 TUR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 1 8 13 50 15
27 27 POL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 23 75  
 
mong the volatile countries Iceland improves its rank under the PCA weighting method when 
 
 
A
normalization of scores is allowed. In this case varying the number of indicators produces large jumps 
of its rank. This is the same explanation for the 15th position of Denmark, that is also sensitive to the 
inclusion of the indicator SC5 and TI1. Canada would shift down in the ranking if the normalization of 
sub-domain scores would be allowed. New Zealand is an interesting case, since the baseline PMR CI 
represents a sort of “extreme” scenario belonging to the 5% of scenarios not shown in Table 11. All 
other methodological choices are likely to improve its ranking position. Australia is especially 
responsive to the methodological choices employed for the construction of the composite. In particular 
the normalization of sub-domain scores is likely to improve Australian rank while the reverse happens 
when the PCA weighting is employed and the number indicators are allowed to vary. The overall 
effect of PCA is shown in Figure 11 and is similar to that of 2003. The highest absolute shift is 
produced when PCA is associated with the drop-out of the domain BTI. 
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Figure 11. Sensitivity of weighting choices 
Effect of weighting
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 Table 11, the worst ranking positions of Norway are mainly imputable to the normalization of sub-
he sudden jump up of Hungary is imputable to the weighting scheme (PCA), whereas Germany is 
In
domain scores, while the upper jump of Japan occurs when TI1 is dropped from the dataset and scores 
normalized. Sweden is favored when allowing the renormalization of sub-domain scores while it is 
disadvantaged when the renormalization happens jointly with a weighing scheme based on PCA. 
Switzerland worsens its position in the PMR ranking by dropping one indicator at the time but does 
not seem to be sensible to any particular indicator. For France the baseline rank is at the lower end of 
the frequency matrix, i.e. with almost any other methodological choice France would see its position 
shifted up, especially renormalizing sub-domain scores.  
 
T
favored by a weighting scheme which does not consider the sub-domain layer and is punished when 
indicators of the domain barriers to entrepreneurship are eliminated. Italy can only loose from 
changing the methodological assumptions of the baseline, especially when indicators of the domains 
state control and barriers to entrepreneurship are eliminated and PCA weighting is used. Finally 
Austria’s volatility is mainly due to joint effect of the normalization and the PCA weighting structure. 
 
 
Findings on the robustness of the PMR composite indicator for 2007 
 
The sensitivity of the PMR CI to the methodology used for its construction is confirmed 
also for 2007 where about half of the countries have a volatile ranking position. Again the 
two main sources of volatility are: the use of PCA weights with a dataset with a different 
number of indicators, as in the previous editions, and the interaction between a weighting 
based on PCA and the normalization of sub-domain scores.  
Notice that the increase over time of the number of volatile countries in the PMR ranking 
is probably a reflection of the convergence of regulatory environments. Small changes in 
underlying methodology are likely to reshuffle countries’ rank the smaller is the 
difference in countries’ score.    
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 6. Structure of the PMR composite indicator: ex-ante analysis  
stablishing a relationship between cause and effect is notoriously difficult; the widely accepted 
A aims at reducing the dimensionality of the dataset by grouping linear combination of indicators 
sually a robust FA requires a relationship 3:1 between data and indicators. Given that for each year 
able 12 shows the results of the FA on the pooled dataset. This technique highlights 7 eigenvalues 
ith different colors we underline the indicators belonging to different sub-domains. It is clear from 
e then consider the indicators belonging to the 3 domains and we perform a FA on each domain 
 
E
statement “correlation does not mean causality” has to be borne in mind. Practically, however, in the 
absence of a genuine theory on “what causes what”, the correlation structure of the data set can be of 
some help in at least excluding causal relationships between variables (but not necessarily between the 
theoretical constructs of which the variable is a manifestation). We have simple tools to investigate the 
relationship between the composite and its components. Ex-ante, from raw data we employ factor 
analysis (FA) and Cluster analysis. Both use the correlation structure of the dataset to extract 
information.  
 
F
into orthogonal factors in order to maximize the information loaded by each factor. Ideally, the 
structure of PMR would be confirmed by the data if each factor would principally load the indicators 
belonging to one (or more) sub-domain(s). This would mean that (i) the indicators of each sub-domain 
convey “similar” or complementary information; (ii) if different domains or sub-domains convey 
different information they are likely to belong to different factors. Such clear-cut picture is however 
rare when dealing with datasets (especially of categorical nature). One has to bear in mind that FA 
cannot be used to include/exclude indicators but only to shed some light in the structure of the index.  
 
U
we have 19 indicators and 27 countries, we are far from the 1:1 relationship. Therefore we pool the 
three years 1998, 2003, 2007 into one dataset where for each indicator we have 81 data points. We 
exploit the pooled dataset to see if the structure in domains is confirmed whereas we keep single 
datasets, thus considering each year separately, to see whether, once imposed the 3-domains structure 
the division in sub-domains is confirmed by the data. 
 
T
greater or equal to one, representing 77% of the variance of the whole dataset. These correspond to 7 
orthogonal factors grouping the information of the dataset.  
 
W
Table 12 that the only 2 sub-domains principally loaded by a single factor are regulatory and 
administrative opacity (BE1-2), and administrative burdens on startups (BE3-4-5), for the rest of 
indicators the grouping given by the factors does not correspond to the grouping by dimension or sub-
dimension.  
 
W
separately in order to see whether, within each domain, the structure of sub-domains is confirmed. 
Table 13, 14 and 15 show the results. For the domain State Control, FA clearly confirms the division 
in sub-domains: the two sub-domains public ownership and involvement in business operations are 
principally loaded by two different factors. The distinction in sub-domains is less clear for the domain 
barriers to entrepreneurship, where the data clearly differentiate the sub-domains regulatory and 
administrative opacity and administrative burdens on startups but not the third sub-domain barriers to 
competition which is split among two factors. A similar picture holds for the third domain barriers to 
trade and investment where the two sub-domains are not clearly split between the two relevant factors. 
In all cases, nevertheless, the number of factors retained is equal to the number of sub-domains. 
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Table 12. Factor loadings for the pooled dataset 1998-2003-2007. In bold the highest loadings. 
Factor Loadings (Varimax normalized)  dataset pooled 1998-2003-2007 
   
    
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 
 
Extraction: Principal components  
  
 
SC1 0.85 0.02 0.32 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.13 
SC2 0.46 -0.13 0.63 -0.33 -0.03 0.15 0.11 
SC3 0.77 0.17 0.22 -0.06 0.00 0.28 0.14 
SC4 0.03 0.59 0.43 -0.15 0.12 0.32 0.01 
SC5 0.18 0.05 0.49 0.25 0.07 0.70 -0.09 
BE1 0.03 0.12 -0.24 -0.32 -0.03 0.70 0.20 
BE2 0.19 0.48 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.49 0.14 
BE3 0.35 0.23 0.77 0.00 0.11 -0.05 0.25 
BE4 0.29 0.24 0.79 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 
BE5 0.27 0.20 0.81 0.25 0.01 0.05 0.04 
BE6 0.38 0.68 0.01 -0.33 -0.02 -0.02 -0.24 
BE7 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.93 -0.01 -0.06 
BE8a 0.12 0.67 0.54 -0.08 -0.08 0.20 0.22 
BE8b -0.01 0.81 0.10 0.10 -0.10 0.02 0.27 
BE9 0.09 -0.06 0.04 0.91 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 
TI1 0.75 0.18 0.31 0.14 -0.09 -0.03 0.24 
TI2 0.07 0.02 0.68 -0.14 -0.50 -0.08 0.25 
TI3 0.39 0.05 0.13 -0.02 -0.21 0.08 0.65 
TI4 0.13 0.17 0.15 -0.04 0.16 0.09 0.80 
Expl.Var 
 
able 13. Factor loadings for the pooled dataset 1998-2003-2007 and for the domain state control.  
actor Loadings (Varimax normalized)  
Factor 1 Factor 2 
2.80 2.43 3.82 1.42 1.25 1.50 1.54 
Prp.Totl 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
 
 
T
In bold the highest loadings. 
 
F
Extraction: Principal components 
 
 
SC1 0.91 0.11 
SC2 0.64 0.41 
SC3 0.88 0.19 
SC4 0.35 0.67 
SC5 0.07 0.90 
Expl.Var 2.12 1.48 
Prp.Totl 0.42 0.30 
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Table 14. Factor loadings for the pooled dataset 1998-2003-2007 and for the domain barriers to 
entrepreneurship.  In bold the highest loadings. 
Factor Loadings (Varimax normalized)  
Extraction: Principal components 
  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
BE1 -0.29 0.53 -0.30 
BE2 0.23 0.58 0.13 
BE3 0.89 0.20 -0.09 
BE4 0.86 0.19 0.03 
BE5 0.90 0.15 0.12 
BE6 0.16 0.66 -0.19 
BE7 -0.21 0.26 0.73 
BE8a 0.58 0.68 0.02 
BE8b 0.24 0.71 0.15 
BE9 0.24 -0.28 0.69 
Expl.Var 3.00 2.26 1.20 
Prp.Totl 0.30 0.23 0.12 
 
Table 15. Factor loadings for the pooled dataset 1998-2003-2007 and for the domain barriers to 
trade.  In bold the highest loadings. 
Factor Loadings (Varimax normalized)  
Extraction: Principal components 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
TI1 0.48 0.60 
TI2 0.67 0.41 
TI3 0.89 0.00 
TI4 0.03 0.91 
Expl.Var 1.46 1.35 
Prp.Totl 0.37 0.34 
 
The FA analysis of each year separately confirms this picture where data support the layout of the 
index as far as the structure of correlation is concerned even if the indicators belonging to each domain 
are not fully loaded by the same component. We also perform k-means cluster analysis on the pooled 
dataset to explore similarities between indicators. We constrain the indicators to cluster in 3 groups of 
according to their degree of “similarity” and we check whether the 3 groups correspond to the 3 
domains.  Table 16 shows the members of the 3 clusters. As in the FA the data does not fully support 
the loading of the indicators as the 3 clusters contain indicators belonging to different domains.5 
 
Table 16. Results of the k-Means cluster analysis with k=3: indicators belonging to each cluster. 
cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 3 
SC4 BE2 SC1 
SC5 BE7 SC2 
BE3 TI3 SC3 
BE4 TI4 BE1 
BE5  BE8 
BE6  BE9 
TI1   
TI2   
 
                                                 
5 A FA constraining to 3 the number of factors confirms the finding of the cluster analysis: only the sub-dimensions PUO 
and IBO can be clearly distinguished. 
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Findings on the structure of PMR composite indicator: ex-ante analysis 
 
The analysis of the datasets 1998, 2003 and 2007 show a good correspondence between 
the structure of the composite indicator (i.e. it division in sub-domains and domains) and 
the pattern found in the data.  
 
 
7. Structure of PMR composite indicator: ex-post analysis 
 
Correlation analysis is used to examine the relationship between the indicators belonging to each of the 
7 sub-domains of the PMR CI (in this case of categorical data Spearman correlation is used6). This is a 
basic but widespread tool for “confirming” ex post the structure of the index. Booysen (2002) in fact 
recommends the exclusion of an indicator if a low correlation between a given indicator and the 
composite would result. A high correlation (when not spurious) indicates a high association of the 
indicator to the composite. However correlation does not exactly quantify the “contribution” of a given 
indicator to the composite which is better represented by path analysis or by the “pie share” analysis. 
 
Table 17. Spearman correlation between indicators, sub-dimensions and dimensions and the 
PMR CI (values not significant at 5% with an asterisk). 
 
                  
  correlation with the PMR CI     correlation with the PMR CI 
  1998 2003 2007     1998 2003 2007 
SC1 0.69 0.65 0.48   PUO 0.78 0.76 0.8 
SC2 0.69 0.63 0.65   IBO 0.71 0.73 0.65 
SC3 0.66 0.67 0.75   RAO 0.2* -0.09* 0.05* 
SC4 0.47 0.56 0.54   ABS 0.86 0.88 0.67 
SC5 0.52 0.61 0.4   BAC 0.43 0.19* 0.03* 
BE1 0.09* -0.14* 0.13*   BTI 0.61 0.82 0.74 
BE2 0.47 0.21* -0.30*   OBA 0.46 0.14* 0.16* 
BE3 0.89 0.85 0.65         
BE4 0.77 0.8 0.53         
BE5 0.71 0.76 0.65         
BE6 0.34* 0.07* -0.02*           
BE7 -0.08* -0.16* -0.17*   SC 0.86 0.88 0.89 
BE8 0.79 0.34* 0.09*   BE 0.84 0.69 0.57 
BE9 -0.03* 0.22* 0.27*   BT 0.74 0.76 0.71 
TI1 0.61 0.54 0.53         
TI2 0.51 0.62 0.6         
TI3 0.40 0.63 0.47         
TI4 0.46 0.14* 0.16*           
 
Table 17 displays the correlation between each indicator, sub-dimension and dimension with the 
composite. All significant correlations are positive as expected. Notice that the indicators belonging to 
the sub-dimensions regulatory and administrative opacity, barriers to competition and to some extent 
                                                 
6 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is defined as follows: )]1(/[61 22 −−= ∑ nndr i iss , with indicating the 
difference between the rank of country i in the indicator s and the rank of the same country in the PMR CI, while n is the 
number of countries in the dataset.  
isd
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(for the years 2003 and 2007) also other barriers are not significantly correlated with the composite, 
suggesting a negligible contribution to it.  
 
Another possibility to verify the contribution of each indicator, sub-domain or domain to the 
composite index is the calculation of the pie shares. Pie shares give a first impression of the actual 
“weight” of an indictor on a composite. If the composite for each country  for  can be 
expressed as , the pie share of indicator  is given by 
n 27,...,1=n
∑== 181i inin IwCI inI
n
inIi
CI
w
PSin = , i.e. the score of 
indicator  divided by the score of the composite. The average across all countries gives the average 
pie share. The comparison between the weight assigned to each indicator and its average pie share 
supplies a first insight on the contribution of this indicator to the overall index score. The principal 
difference with the correlation displayed in Table 17 is that the pie share depends on the scores of the 
indicators. Indicators with high scores will, ceteris paribus, contribute more to the composite. Table 18 
below shows the pie shares of the entire dataset, while Table 19 displays the range of variation of each 
indicator, sub-domain, and domain.  
inI
 
Table 18. Pie shares of each indicator, sub-domain and domain.  
 
                    
  
pie 
shares         
pie 
shares       
  1998 2003 2007 EW   1998 2003 2007 EW 
SC1 9.2% 11.4% 11.1% 5.6% PUO 27.7% 33.5% 36.1% 16.7% 
SC2 8.9% 10.9% 10.4% 5.6% IBO 19.8% 15.9% 14.3% 16.7% 
SC3 9.6% 11.3% 10.0% 5.6% RAO 12.1% 10.3% 8.5% 11.1% 
SC4 9.1% 5.3% 2.9% 8.3% ABS 11.4% 12.5% 12.0% 11.1% 
SC5 10.7% 10.6% 5.6% 8.3% BAC 13.3% 14.5% 15.0% 11.1% 
BE1 9.5% 8.7% 6.4% 5.6% BTI 11.3% 11.8% 11.9% 16.7% 
BE2 2.7% 1.6% 0.9% 5.6% OBA 4.3% 1.5% 2.2% 16.7% 
BE3 3.9% 4.4% 5.8% 3.7%         
BE4 4.2% 4.4% 5.7% 3.7%         
BE5 3.4% 3.7% 4.8% 3.7%         
BE6 2.6% 2.7% 3.9% 2.8%           
BE7 1.2% 1.2% 2.0% 2.8% SC 47.5% 49.4% 50.4% 33.3% 
BE8 5.0% 4.6% 6.9% 2.8% BE 36.8% 37.3% 35.5% 33.3% 
BE9 4.6% 6.0% 11.9% 2.8% BT 15.6% 13.2% 14.1% 33.3% 
TI1 5.0% 5.8% 4.6% 5.6%         
TI2 3.6% 4.6% 4.1% 5.6%         
TI3 2.7% 1.4% 2.3% 5.6%         
TI4 4.3% 1.5% 0.7% 16.7%           
 
State Control is the domain contributing the most to the PMR composite indicator in all years 
considered: vis á vis a weight of 1/3, the actual pie share ranges from 48% to 50%. Within this domain 
the highest contribution is given by the indicators belonging to public ownership. Within involvement 
in business operation the indicator SC5 supplies the highest contribution. Notice, however, that this 
result partially depends on the scores of the indicators belonging to this domain: it is not a case that 
SC4, with the lowest range of variation, marginally contributes to the composite in spite of a 
correlation with the composite similar to the one of SC5.  
 
The domain Barriers to trade and investment combine the lowest contribution in terms of pie shares 
with the lowest range of variation. The Spearman correlation coefficient, however confirms the 
absence of significant correlation only for the sub-domain Other barriers and for the years 2003 and 
2007. Within the domain Barriers to entrepreneurship significant correlation with the composite is 
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found for the sub-domains Administrative burdens on start-ups for all years and Barriers to 
competition for the years 2003 and 2007. The average pie shares of indicators, sub-domains and 
domains are in line with the weights (slightly higher in the case of Barriers to competition).  
 
It has to be noted that pie shares measure the importance of one low-level indicator as a percentage of 
the aggregate PMR indicator score. As a consequence, since most OECD countries have been reducing 
the level of aggregate regulation significantly over the 1998 to 2007 period, those regulatory areas 
where reform has been weaker than on the aggregate would receive an increasing importance in terms 
of pie shares. This is, for instance, the case for barriers to entry in services (BE9) as well as for the 
sub-domain public ownership (PUO). 
 
Comparing Table 17 and Table 18 highlights differences in the importance of certain low-level 
indicators that might provide some guidance in view of possible future "interim" updates of the PMR 
based on working a subset of "core" low-level indicators. If the aim of the core subset of indicators is 
to choose indicators with relatively high scores, but which are representative for the aggregate PMR 
indicator (as reflected in a strong correlation) the selection of indicators would comprise the low-level 
indicators in the sub-domain public ownership of the domain state control (SC1, SC2, SC3), as well as 
the low-level indicators in the administrative burdens for start-ups (BE3, BE4, BE5) sub-domain 
within the barriers to entrepreneurship domain. Another candidate by these criteria would be the low-
level indicator for barriers to FDI within the barriers to trade and investment domain. 
 
However, if the aim of the core sub set of indicators is to cover (equally) those indicators with a large 
potential for future reform, the selection would (also) include the barriers to entry in network sectors 
and in services (BE8, BE9). These two indicators show a very strong contribution in terms of pie 
shares, but do not show a significant correlation with the aggregate PMR; the latter reflecting that most 
countries do show relatively high scores in these regulatory areas, i.e. also those countries that would 
otherwise be characterized by relatively liberal regulatory environments.  
 
Table 19. Range of variation [min, max] for the score of each indicator-, sub-domain- and 
domain. 
                  
  range of variation       range of variation   
  1998 2003 2007     1998 2003 2007 
SC1 [0.8, 6] [0.8, 5.8] [1.3, 6]   PUO [1.5, 5.6] [1.5, 5.3] [1.3, 5.3] 
SC2 [0.8, 5.6] [0.7, 5.4] [0, 6]   IBO [1.1, 4.6] [0.2, 3] [0.1, 3.7] 
SC3 [0.8, 5.8] [0.8, 5.8] [0.8, 4.2]   RAO [0.3, 4] [0.1, 3.3] [0, 3.3] 
SC4 [0.2, 4.2] [0, 2.8] [0.1, 2.9]   ABS [0.3, 4.8] [0.4, 3.9] [0.5, 3.8] 
SC5 [1, 5.2] [0.1, 4.5] [0.1, 4.4]   BAC [1.7, 3.8] [1.1, 3.3] [0.8, 3.3] 
BE1 [0, 6] [0, 6] [0, 6]   BTI [0.5, 4] [0.4, 3.1] [0.2, 3] 
BE2 [0.3, 2.6] [0, 2.6] [0, 1]   OBA [0, 4.4] [0, 1.6] [0, 1.6] 
BE3 [0.5, 5.5] [0.8, 4.3] [0.5, 4]         
BE4 [0.3, 4.3] [0, 4] [0, 4.3]         
BE5 [0, 4.7] [0.3, 4.1] [0.2, 3.8]         
BE6 [0.3, 3.5] [0.3, 2.3] [0.3, 2.6]           
BE7 [0, 3.6] [0, 3] [0, 3.1]   SC [1.4, 4.9] [1.2, 4.2] [0.8, 3.8] 
BE8 [1.1, 5.3] [0.8, 4.7] [0.3, 4.6]   BE [1, 3.5] [1, 2.6] [0.8, 2.4] 
BE9 [0.3, 5] [0.6, 5.1] [1.1, 5]   BT [0.2, 4.2] [0.2, 2.1] [0.2, 1.6] 
TI1 [0.2, 3.6] [0.4, 3.4] [0.2, 3.5]         
TI2 [0, 5] [0, 6] [0, 6]         
TI3 [0, 4.4] [0, 1.4] [0, 2.9]         
TI4 [0, 4.4] [0, 1.6] [0, 1.6]           
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Findings on the structure of PMR composite indicator: ex-post analysis 
 
The analysis of the relationship between the PMR composite indicator and its 
components (indicators, sub-domains and domains) shows a discrepancy between the 
theoretical “worth” of each component, i.e. the weight, and the actual influence of each 
component in the composite. The CI is rather imbalanced towards the domains state 
control and barriers to entrepreneurship which count the double or even the triple of the 
domain barriers to trade and investment. This in spite of the fact the weighting scheme 
takes into account the disparity in the number of indicators belonging to each sub-
domain.   
 
 
More on the normalization 
 
The previous analysis draws attention to the role of normalization of row data. In spite of being 
theoretically expressed in [0, 6] scale, their range of variation is very different across indicators. Some 
of them (mainly the indicators belonging to the domains state control and barriers to 
entrepreneurship) take values nearer to six and some others nearer to zero (those belonging to barriers 
to trade and investment). This could have an effect on the final index favoring the first two domains 
with the “heaviest” indicators (Table 18). In order to sort out the effect of the normalization we 
compute the PMR CI using normalized data.  
 
Table 20. Effect of the normalization.  
 
            
        difference with the baseline
  baseline z-scores min-max z-scores  min-max 
AUS 5 6 6 -1 -1 
AUT 14 16 14 -2 0 
BEL 13 12 12 1 1 
CAN 3 4 4 -1 -1 
CZE 24 24 24 0 0 
DNK 6 5 5 1 1 
FIN 12 13 13 -1 -1 
FRA 20 21 21 -1 -1 
DEU 11 11 11 0 0 
HUN 17 18 18 -1 -1 
ISL 8 8 8 0 0 
ITA 23 23 23 0 0 
JPN 15 14 15 1 0 
KOR 18 17 17 1 1 
LUX - - - - - 
MEX 19 19 19 0 0 
NLD 7 7 7 1 1 
NZL 4 3 3 0 0 
NOR 9 9 9 0 0 
POL 26 26 26 1 0 
PRT 16 15 16 -1 -1 
ESP 21 22 22 0 0 
SWE 10 10 10 2 2 
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CHE 22 20 20 0 0 
TUR 25 25 25 0 0 
UKM 1 1 1 0 0 
USA 2 2 2 0 0 
 
Table 20 shows countries’ rank when the data used are (i) the original ones (baseline), (ii) the z-score 
of the original data, and (iii) the min-max transformation of the original data.7 According to the results 
normalization influences negatively the rank of Austria and Hungary but positively that of Korea, 
Spain but especially Switzerland. The two types of normalization do not produce appreciable 
differences in ranking.  
 
In terms of pie shares Table 21 shows the contribution of indicators sub-domains and domains when 
the data are normalized. The contribution of the single indicators is more balanced as well as that of 
sub-domains and domains. The landscape is however not dramatically changed with respect to the 
baseline: normalization only marginally reduces the disproportion on the contribution of different 
variables but the imbalance still remains and is due to the high number of zeros (and in general of low 
values) in the indicators belonging to the domain barriers to trade and investment. 
 
 
Table 21. Pie shares with normalized data. 
 
  data in max-min               
  pie shares         pie shares       
  1998 2003 2007 EW   1998 2003 2007 EW 
SC1 7.2% 8.0% 7.2% 5.6% PUO 22.2% 24.1% 26.9% 16.7% 
SC2 7.4% 8.4% 9.2% 5.6% IBO 19.2% 19.2% 16.4% 16.7% 
SC3 7.7% 7.8% 10.5% 5.6% RAO 12.9% 10.1% 11.5% 11.1% 
SC4 11.0% 8.6% 6.4% 8.3% ABS 11.8% 12.1% 12.0% 11.1% 
SC5 8.2% 10.6% 10.0% 8.3% BAC 14.7% 16.0% 14.6% 11.1% 
BE1 8.8% 7.1% 5.8% 5.6% BTI 14.1% 14.6% 13.2% 16.7% 
BE2 4.2% 2.9% 5.7% 5.6% OBA 5.0% 3.9% 5.5% 16.7% 
BE3 3.0% 3.2% 3.7% 3.7%         
BE4 4.9% 5.1% 4.6% 3.7%         
BE5 3.8% 3.7% 3.8% 3.7%         
BE6 3.6% 5.2% 3.5% 2.8%           
BE7 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.8% SC 41.4% 43.4% 43.2% 33.3% 
BE8 4.3% 3.7% 3.7% 2.8% BE 39.4% 38.1% 38.1% 33.3% 
BE9 4.9% 5.2% 5.5% 2.8% BT 19.1% 18.5% 18.6% 33.3% 
TI1 6.9% 6.4% 6.1% 5.6%         
TI2 3.9% 3.6% 3.4% 5.6%         
TI3 3.3% 4.7% 3.7% 5.6%         
TI4 5.0% 3.9% 5.5% 16.7%           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Z-scores are computed by subtracting to each indicator the mean and divide by the standard deviation. Min-max is 
calculate by subtracting the minimum and dividing by the difference by the max. and he min. 
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8. Conclusions  
 
The product market regulation (PMR) composite indicator tries to transform qualitative laws and 
regulations that may affect competition into a quantitative indicator using a bottom-up approach; 18 low-
level indicators obtained from a survey of member states are grouped in 7 sub-domains and subsequently 
in 3 domains, state control, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment. Overall 
the PMR indicator is computed for 27 countries (26 in 1998) and for three years 1998, 2003, and 2007 
 
We employ robustness analysis to test the sensitivity of PMR ranking to the different methodological 
assumptions. In particular we account for the structure of PMR in domains and sub-domains, the 
normalization of the original data, the weighting of indicators, domains and sub-domains, and the 
aggregation method. Our analysis is twofold: we consider each methodological choice individually 
(individual analysis) but also we consider all the possible sources of variability together and study its 
joint effect on the PMR ranking (multi-modeling approach). 
 
The individual analysis shows that, within the available datasets, there is no significant difference in 
country rankings between using equal weighting or PCA-retrieved weights (used in the previous 
editions of PMR), pointing to a negligible effect of double counting which is diluted by the structure of 
the PMR composite indicator. Yet the theoretical dependency of PCA weighting scheme on the 
number of countries and the year of calculation make EW a preferable solution for the calculation of 
the PMR indicator. If compensation between domains is not allowed, the country ranking is only 
moderately affected proving that compensation is not an issue in the PMR. The most volatile countries 
are those who perform better (worse) in indicators belonging to the domains state control and barriers 
to entrepreneurship.  
 
The solidity of the baseline is confirmed by the multi-modeling approach. The sensitivity of the PMR 
CI to the methodology used for its construction is nevertheless increasing in time. In 2007 about half 
of the countries have a volatile ranking position (vis à vis 1998 when only 7 out of 27 countries were 
considered volatile). The two main sources of volatility in all datasets considered are the use of PCA 
weights with a dataset with a different number of indicators and the normalization of sub-domain 
scores. The increase over time of the number of volatile countries in the PMR ranking is probably a 
reflection of the convergence of regulatory environments. Small changes in underlying methodology 
are likely to reshuffle countries’ rank the smaller is the difference in countries’ score.    
 
The analysis of the datasets 1998, 2003 and 2007 show a correspondence between the structure of the 
composite indicator (i.e. it division in sub-domains and domains) and the pattern found in the data.  
Finally the analysis of the relationship between the PMR composite indicator and its components 
(indicators, sub-domains and domains) shows a discrepancy between the theoretical “worth” of each 
component, i.e. the weight, and the actual influence of each component in the composite. The CI is 
rather imbalanced towards the domains state control and barriers to entrepreneurship which count the 
double or even the triple of the domain barriers to trade and investment. This in spite of the fact the 
weighting scheme takes into account the disparity in the number of indicators belonging to each sub-
domain.  
 
The importance of certain low-level indicators might however provide some guidance in view of 
possible future "interim" updates of the PMR based on working a subset of "core" low-level indicators. 
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Acronyms: structure of the PMR 
 
 
State Control (SC) 
 
Public Ownership (PUO) 
• SC1. Scope of public enterprises 
• SC2. Direct control over business enterprise. 
• SC3. Government involvement in infrastructure sector (NEW, 2003) 
 
 
Involvement in business operations (IBO) 
• SC4. Price controls. 
• SC5. Use of command and control regulation. 
 
 
Barriers to entrepreneurship (BE) 
 
Regulatory and administrative opacity (RAO) 
• BE1. Licenses and permits systems. 
• BE2. Communication and simplification of rules and procedures. 
 
Administrative burdens on start-ups (ABS) 
• BE3. Administrative burdens for corporations. 
• BE4. Administrative burdens for sole proprietors. 
• BE5. Sector-specific administrative burdens. 
 
Barriers to competition (BAC) 
• BE6. Legal barriers. 
• BE7. Antitrust exemptions. 
• BE8. Barriers to entry in services  
o BE8a. Entry regulation in infrastructure sector (NEW, 2003) 
o BE8b. Vertical integration in infrastructure sector (NEW, 2003) 
• BE9. Barriers to entry in services (NEW, 2003) 
 
 
Barriers to trade and investment (BT) 
 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment (BTI) 
• TI1. Ownership barriers. 
• TI2. Tariffs. 
• TI3. Discriminatory procedures. 
 
Other barriers (OBA) 
• TI4. Regulatory barriers. 
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Abstract 
The construction of a composite indicator (CI) involves stages where choices have to be made: the 
structure of PMR in domains and sub-domains, the normalization of the original data, the weighting of 
indicators, domains and sub-domains, and the aggregation method. All these choices will affect both 
the ranking and the message brought by the CI in a way that deserves analysis and corroboration. 
Robustness analysis is a powerful tool to test the sensitivity of PMR ranking to the different 
methodological assumptions. In particular we are interested in three questions. Does the use of one 
construction strategy versus another provide actually a partial picture of the countries’ performance? 
Which countries have large uncertainty bounds in their rank (volatile countries)? Which are the factors 
that affect the countries rankings? We employ two strategies to answer to these questions. We consider 
each methodological choice individually and we study its effect on PMR ranking and we consider all 
the possible sources of variability together and study its joint effect on the PMR ranking. 
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